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RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRAUCHIGER–RENNER
PARADOX AND EXISTENCE OF RECORDS FROM THE PAST
MARIJN WAAIJER & JAN VAN NEERVEN
Abstract. We present an analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner Gedankenexper-
iment from the point of view of the relational interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. Our analysis indicates that the paradox obtained by Frauchiger and
Renner arises from a combination of allowing self-measurement and reason-
ing about other agent’s knowledge in the past without validation by surviving
records. A by-product of our analysis is an interaction-free detection scheme
for the existence of records from the past.
1. Introduction
In their recent paper [9], Frauchiger and Renner propose an interesting Gedanken-
experiment which can be thought of as an extension of (Deutsch’s [6] extension of)
the classical Wigner’s Friend paradox [18]. It describes a protocol involving two
labs, L and L, operated by the ‘friends’ F and F , respectively. A spin 1
2
-particle S,
whose state is determined by a quantum coin R, is prepared in lab L and sent to
L. Subsequently the labs L and L are measured, in suitably chosen bases, by two
‘Wigners’ W and W . Frauchiger and Renner argue that, with probability one, W
will arrive at contradictory measurement outcomes if one simultaneously accepts
(Q) quantum mechanics: the rules of quantum mechanics apply to all agents;
(C) consistency: if agent A has established that “I am certain that agent B is
certain that x = ξ at time t”, then agent A can conclude that “I am certain
that x = ξ at time t.”
On the basis of the paradox it is argued in [9] that (Q) and (C) are incompatible
with the ‘single world assumption’ (S) that measurement outcomes are unique.
Although there is no explicit reference to the time at which A has established
his/her statement, scrutinising the arguments one finds that this could be a time
different from t. In fact, the following more precise version of (C) is actually used:
if agent A has established at time t0 that “I am certain that agent B will be certain
that x = ξ at time t1 > t0”, then at time t0 agent A can conclude that “I am
certain that x = ξ at time t.”
The Frauchiger–Renner paradox has provoked intense discussion and has been
analysed from various points of view [1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 14, 17]. The aim of this note
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is to analyse and resolve it from the point of view of Rovelli’s relational interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics (RQM)1 [15] (see also [8, 12, 16]). RQM is inspired by
general covariance considerations in quantum gravity and extrapolates the lessons
learnt from relativity, which teaches us that ‘time’ and ‘space’ are observer depen-
dent, to quantum mechanics by arguing that also the notion of ‘state’ should be
considered observer-dependent. In this view, physics is the study of consistency
of the records that different observers give of the observed phenomena. These ob-
servers are allowed to have different accounts as to what their records mean and
how they should be interpreted. Thus RQM keeps metaphysics and ontology to
the barest minimum, based on the consistency of reports of different observers,
while preserving a notion of objective reality making scientific exchange possible
and meaningful. An instructive example of how this works in the case of the EPR
paradox has been worked out in [16], where the tenets of RQM are eloquently
summarised:
“In RQM, physical reality is taken to be formed by the individual quantum events
(facts) through which interacting systems (objects) affect one another. Quantum
events are therefore assumed to exist only in interactions and (this is the central
point) the character of each quantum event is only relative to the system involved
in the interaction. In particular, which properties any given system S has is only
relative to a physical system A that interacts with S and is affected by these prop-
erties.
If A can keep track of the sequence of her past interactions with S, then A has
information about S, in the sense that S and A’s degrees of freedom are corre-
lated. According to RQM, this relational information exhausts the content of any
observer’s description of the physical world.”
An essential point of our analysis is therefore to consider the experiment from the
perspective of each agent separately, carefully keeping track of who knows what at
what time, and to base all inferences exclusively on the available information at
the given moment from the perspective taken. The conclusions of our analysis are
twofold and may be stated as follows.
(1) The Gedankenexperiment reveals no conflict between (Q) and the following
restricted version (Cpres) of (C):
If at time t1 agent A has established that “I am certain that agent
B is certain at time t that x = ξ at time t”, then at time t agent
A can conclude that “I am certain that x = ξ at time t.”
(cf. Subsection 5.1.)
(2) Two steps in the derivation of the Frauchiger–Renner paradox require self-
descriptions, by the friends F and F respectively, and one step relies on
inferences about the past of quantum mechanical systems that keep no
records of their history. (cf. Subsection 5.2.)
(3) The very existence of records of the measurements by F and F can lead
to different predictions of certain measurement outcomes. (cf. Subsection
5.3.)
1Such an analysis has already been carried out in [19], but we were unable to understand
various points in the reasoning. Moreover the conclusions of this paper differ from ours. We leave
it to the reader to decide about the merits of each approach.
RELATIONAL FRAUCHIGER–RENNER 3
It is claimed in [9] (see Table 4) that in RQM one has to sacrifice (C). However,
conclusion (2) exhibits the use of implicit schemes of reasoning in [9] which are not
permitted in RQM, rendering the claim unwarranted. Within different interpre-
tations of quantum mechanics, objections in the same spirit as (2) have been put
forward in [13, 17] (self-measurement) and [10] (ambiguity of the past).
Conclusion (3) is a variation on the Elitzur–Vaidman interaction-free detection
scheme. It has the interesting additional feature that the records, once created,
have no interaction whatsoever with the rest of the system and can nevertheless be
detected. We consider this one of the main contributions of this note.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the Gedankenexperiment and summarise the main steps in the reasoning in [9]. In
Section 3 we begin our analysis of the experiment in the framework of RQM by
first leaving out the public announcements of the Wigners. The full experiment is
analysed in Section 4. The main conclusion is that the accounts about the outcome
of the experiment given by the various agents from their perspectives agree at all
points with the account of an external observer. In that sense, there is no paradox
at all. In the final Section 5 we critically examine the individual steps in the
Frauchiger–Renner argument within the RQM formalism. This leads to the three
conclusions stated above.
2. Description of the Gedankenexperiment
Following the notation of [9] we will begin by describing the Gedankenexperi-
ment. It involves four agents: two ‘Wigners’ (W and W ) and two ‘friends’ (F and
F ). The four agents agree beforehand on a protocol which is repeatedly run until
the halting condition specified in the last step is reached. Each run consists of the
following steps.
0. At t = 0 the following step has been completed: F prepares a quantum
coin R in the following superposition of the ‘tail’ and ‘head’ states |t〉R and
|h〉R √
2
3
|t〉R +
√
1
3
|h〉R
and measures it in the {|t〉R , |h〉R} basis. If the outcome is ‘tail’, F sends
a spin- 1
2
particle S to F in superposition state 1√
2
|↑〉S + 1√2 |↓〉S ; if the
outcome is ‘head’, she sends the particle in state |↓〉S .
1. At t = 1 the following steps have been completed: F measures S in the
{|↑〉S , |↓〉S} basis.
2. At t = 2 the following steps have been completed: W measures the lab
L = {R,F} in an orthonormal basis containing
∣∣ok〉
W
and
∣∣fail〉
W
, where
∣∣ok〉
L
:=
1√
2
|h〉R |h〉F −
1√
2
|t〉R |t〉F
∣∣fail〉
L
:=
1√
2
|h〉R |h〉F +
1√
2
|t〉R |t〉F ,
and announces the result to everyone.
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3. At t = 3 the following steps have been completed: W measures the lab
L = {S, F} in an orthonormal basis containing |ok〉W and |fail〉W , where
|ok〉L :=
1√
2
|↓〉S |↓〉F −
1√
2
|↑〉S |↑〉F ,
|fail〉L :=
1√
2
|↓〉s |↓〉F +
1√
2
|↑〉S |↑〉F
and announces the result to everyone. If W and W have both announced
‘ok’ (the halting condition) the experiment is halted; otherwise, the protocol
is repeated.
An easy computation, reproduced below, shows that from the perspective of a fifth
external observer C, in each run the halting condition is reached with probability
1
12
. It is also shown below that W and W reach the same conclusion from their
perspectives. Therefore, W and W agree with C that with probability one the
halting condition will be eventually met.
It should be mentioned that [9] only assumes measurements by W and W in
orthonormal bases containing
∣∣ok〉
W
and |ok〉W , respectively, and that the agents
announce ‘fail’ in all cases when their measurement differs from ‘ok’. Our slightly
stronger assumption, where
∣∣fail〉
L
and |fail〉L are explicitly added to the bases,
has the advantage of allowing simple explicit computations and does not affect the
conclusions of our analysis.
2.1. The paradox. Of interest is what happens in the final run of the experiment
which leads to the halting condition. In [9] it is argued that if one simultaneously
accepts the hypotheses (Q) and (C) introduced earlier, then the following assertions
hold simultaneously:
• in each run, with probability 1
12
both W and W measure ‘ok’.
• in the final run W is certain to announce ‘fail’.
The assertion implies that with probability one the halting condition will be eventu-
ally reached. By definition, in that roundW andW announce ‘ok’. This contradicts
the second assertion.
The argument by Frauchiger and Renner leading to the second conclusion can
be summarised in four main steps as follows:
(i) If F measures ‘tail’ at t = 0, she sends the particle in state 1√
2
|↑〉S + 1√2 |↓〉S ,
and infers that W will announce ‘fail’.
(ii) If F measures ‘up’ at t = 1, she is certain that F must have measured ‘tail’
at t = 0. Because of (i) and the consistency hypothesis (C), F therefore is certain
that W will announce ‘fail’.
(iii) If W measures ‘ok’ at time t = 2, he infers that F must have measured the
spin to be ‘up’ at t = 1. Because of (ii), W is then certain that F is certain that
W will announce ‘fail’. Hence by (C), W is certain that W will announce ‘fail’.
(iv) If W hearsW announce ‘ok’ at time t = 2, so by (iii) W is certain that W is
certain that W will announce ‘fail’. Hence by (C), W is certain to announce ‘fail’.
Here we just reproduced the main steps; for the intermediate reasoning leading to
them we refer to the original paper. An analysis from the point of view taken in
the present paper is given in the final section. There, we will argue that each of the
steps (i), (ii), (iii) is problematic: the first two because of self-reference problems
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and (iii) because it involves beliefs about the past in the absence of records which
need revision in the presence of records.
3. Relational analysis of a modified Gedankenexperiment
Before analysing the Gedankenexperiment as originally proposed by Frauchiger
and Renner, we introduce a minor modification to their protocol. In the modified
protocol, instead of announcing the outcome of his measurement right away, W
keeps it secret until the end of the run. This has the obvious advantage that
no assumptions need te be made as to how the other agents should interpret the
information that can be inferred from W ’s announcement and how it affects their
descriptions of the experiment. All we assume is hypothesis (Q), according to which
the agents may use the rules of quantum mechanics to describe the experiment
from their vantage points. Any conclusions drawn from this scenario will of course
remain valid in the original Frauchiger–Renner scenario, which we consider in the
next section.
We will analyse the modified Gedankenexperiment from the points of view of the
agentsW ,W , and the external observer C separately. From the points of view of F
and F a complete analysis of the experiment is not possible: When F attempts to
describe the joint state ofR, S, F ,W , andW , she will run into difficulties describing
W ’s measurement of her lab L = {R,F}, of which she is part. Describing L from
the view of F amounts to letting F perform a self-measurement; but this is to be
avoided [2, 11]. Likewise, F will not be able to describe the measurement by W of
her lab L = {S, F} of which she is part.
3.1. The point of view of F . We start by analysing F ’s perspective until W is
about to perform his measurement.
We assume that F ’s measurement of R results in ‘tail’ (the case of ‘head’ being
of no interest here). After the spin particle has been prepared, at time t = 0 F
describes the joint state of R, S, F , W , and W as follows:
(1) |Ψ〉F,t=0
RFSWW
= |t〉R |0〉F
( 1√
2
|↑〉S +
1√
2
|↓〉S
)
|0〉W |0〉W ,
where |0〉 denote ready-to-measure states. Now F measures the spin of S. Accord-
ing to F this entangles the states of S and F . The resulting joint state will be
described by F as
(2)
|Ψ〉F,t=1
RFSWW
= |t〉R
( 1√
2
|↑〉F |↑〉S +
1√
2
|↓〉F |↓〉S
)
|0〉W |0〉W
= |t〉R |fail〉L |0〉W |0〉W .
At this point, W measures the lab L = {R,F}. The present formalism does not
permit F to make any prediction about W ’s findings because F ’s state is not
included F ’s description of the experiment.
3.2. The point of view of F . Next we analyse F ’s perspective until W is about
to perform his measurement.
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Once R has been prepared and measured by F and the spin particle has been
prepared, at time t = 0 F describes the joint state of R, F , S,W , andW as follows:
(3)
|Ψ〉F,t=0
RFSWW
=
(√2
3
|t〉R |t〉F
( 1√
2
|↑〉S +
1√
2
|↓〉S
)
+
1√
3
|h〉R |h〉F |↓〉S
)
|0〉W |0〉W .
Now F measures the spin of S.
If she finds S to be ‘up’, the probability of which she evaluated beforehand (at
t = 0) to be 1
3
, at t = 1 she describes the new state as
(4)
|Ψ〉F,t=1
RFSWW
= |t〉R |t〉F |↑〉S |0〉W |0〉W
=
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
− 1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
) |↑〉S |0〉W |0〉W .
Consequently she is certain that measuring R and F at t = 1 would both result
in ‘up’. Still assuming she found S to be ‘up’, right after W ’s measurement she
describes the new state as follows:
(5) |Ψ〉F,t=2
RFSWW
=
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
) |↑〉S |0〉W .
She concludes that with probability 1
3
× 1
2
= 1
6
, W will have measured ‘ok’. Here
she is forced to stop her analysis: At t = 3 her lab, of which she herself is part, is
going to be measured by W .
In conclusion,
Before each run, F evaluates the probability that W will report ‘ok’ to
be 1
6
.
3.3. The point of view of W . The first few steps are similar: after preparing
and measuring R and preparing S, at t = 0 W describes the joint state of R, F , S,
F and W as
(6) |Ψ〉W,t=0
RFSFW
=
( 1√
3
|t〉R |t〉F
(|↑〉S + |↓〉S)+ 1√3 |h〉R |h〉F |↓〉S
)
|0〉F |0〉W .
Then the spin particle S is measured by F . At t = 1, W describes the resulting
state as
(7)
|Ψ〉W,t=1
RFSFW
=
( 1√
3
|t〉R |t〉F
(|↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉S |↓〉F )+ 1√3 |h〉R |h〉F |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
( 1√
3
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
− 1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
)(|↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉S |↓〉F )
+
1√
3
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
+
1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
) |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
(∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
|↑〉S |↑〉F +
√
2
3
|↓〉S |↓〉F
)
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F
)
|0〉W .
At this point, W measures the lab L = {R,F}. We are interested in the sce-
nario that W measures ‘ok’ which, on the basis of (7), he expects to happen with
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probability 1
6
. In that scenario, at t = 2 he describes the new state as
(8) |Ψ〉W,t=2
RFSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F |0〉W .
Rewriting (8) as
(9)
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
) |0〉W ,
W infers that if he measures ‘ok’, then W will report ‘ok’ with probability 1
2
. Now
knowing W ’s outcome, at t = 3 he will describe the state by
(10) |Ψ〉W,t=3
RFSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
2
|fail〉L |fail〉W −
1√
2
|ok〉L |ok〉W
)
,
In conclusion,
Before each run, W evaluates the probability that he will report ‘ok’ to
be 1
6
, and that if that happens the probability that W will report ‘ok’ is
1
2
. Consequently, W expects that with probability 1
12
, both he and W
will report ‘ok’.
3.4. The point of view of W . The step t = 0 is similar as for W and is skipped.
After the spin particle S has been created by F and measured by F , W describes
the joint state of R, F , S, F , and W by
(11)
|Ψ〉W,t=1
RFSFW
=
( 1√
3
|t〉R |t〉F
(|↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉S |↓〉F )+ 1√3 |h〉R |h〉F |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
( 1√
3
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
− 1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
)(|↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉S |↓〉F )
+
1√
3
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
+
1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
) |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
(∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
|↑〉S |↑〉F +
√
2
3
|↓〉S |↓〉F
)
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F
)
|0〉W .
At this point, W measures the lab L. From the point of view of W this leads to
the description
(12)
|Ψ〉W,t=2
RFSFW
=
∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
|↑〉S |↑〉F +
√
2
3
|↓〉S |↓〉F
) ∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F
∣∣ok〉
W
.
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The preceding formula can be rewritten as
(13)∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
)
+
√
2
3
( 1√
2
|fail〉L +
1√
2
|ok〉L
)) ∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
) ∣∣ok〉
W
=
∣∣fail〉
L
(√3
4
|fail〉L +
1√
12
|ok〉L
) ∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
) ∣∣ok〉
W
.
On the basis of this, W expects with probability 1
12
that both he and W are going
to report ‘ok’. Also, W expects W to announce ‘ok’ with probability 1
12
+ 1
12
= 1
6
.
Not knowing W ’s outcome, upon measuring ‘ok’ W will describe the new state as
(14) |Ψ〉W,t=3
RFSFW
=
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
∣∣fail〉
W
+
1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
)
|ok〉L .
In conclusion,
Before each run, W evaluates the probability that W will report ‘ok’ to
be 1
6
, and the probability that both W and he will report ‘ok’ to be 1
12
.
3.5. The external point of view. We now take the point of view of an external
observer C (Charlie), who only receives the measurement outcomes of W and W
but not from F and F (in this respect C is different from the ‘super-observer’ of
[10]).
When F measures S, at t = 1 the observer C describes the joint state of R, F ,
S, F , W , and W as
(15)
|Ψ〉C,t=1
RFSFWW
=
1√
3
(
|t〉R |t〉F
(|↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉S |↓〉F )+ |h〉R |h〉F |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W |0〉W .
Next W measures L. At t = 2 C describes the result as
(16)
|Ψ〉C,t=2
RFSFWW
=
(∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
|↑〉S |↑〉F +
√
2
3
|↓〉S |↓〉F
) ∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F
∣∣ok〉
W
)
|0〉W .
On the basis of this, C predicts that W will announce ‘ok’ with probability 1
6
.
Then W performs his measurement and, arguing as in (13), C updates his de-
scription to
(17)
|Ψ〉C,t=3
RFSFWW
=
∣∣fail〉
L
(√3
4
|fail〉L |fail〉W +
1√
12
|ok〉L |ok〉W
) ∣∣fail〉
W
− 1√
6
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
2
|fail〉L |fail〉W −
1√
2
|ok〉L |ok〉W
) ∣∣ok〉
W
.
On the basis of this, C expects that with probability 1
12
bothW andW report ‘ok’.
We reach the following conclusion:
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Before each run, C evaluates the probability that W will report ‘ok’ to
be 1
6
, and the probability that both W and W will report ‘ok’ to be 1
12
.
4. Relational analysis of the Frauchiger–Renner
Gedankenexperiment
In the original Gedankenexperiment, W announces the outcome of his measure-
ment before W performs his measurement. From this announcement, he and the
other agents are able to deduce various bits of new information. For instance, when
W measures ‘ok’, in view of (8) he is certain that a measurement of S would give
‘up’, and the other agents are certain at that point that W is certain that a mea-
surement of S would give ‘up’. In contrast to our analysis up to this point, in order
to analyse how W ’s announcement affects everyone’s analysis we will accept the
following principle:
Hypothesis (Cpres) (“Shared knowledge of the present”): If, at time t = k, agent
A is certain that agent B is certain that a measurement of the system X at that
moment would result in the value x, then at t = k agent A is certain that a mea-
surement of the system X at that moment would result in the value x.
This hypothesis allows A to infer new information from announcements made by B.
Since B could make his announcement by entering a written record in a notebook
which he could pass for inspection to A, even from the relational point of view it
is reasonable to accept this hypothesis. It reflects the way we do science and is
reasonable on epistemological grounds in that it offers the possibility to check our
beliefs by actually performing a measurement of X at t = k (although admittedly
this may change our description of the state and we may not be able to resume the
experiment in its original state).
Let us first take the perspective of W and assume that he measures ‘ok’. He
then describes the state of R, F , S, F , W by (8), i.e.,
(18) |Ψ〉W,t=2
RFSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F |0〉W .
When W also reports ‘ok’, W uses hypothesis (Cpres) to update his description at
t = 3 to
(19) |Ψ〉W,t=3
RFSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
|ok〉L |ok〉W .
From this he concludes that a measurement of S and F at t = 3 will give ‘up’ and
‘down’ with equal probability 1
2
.
From the perspective of W , when W announces ‘ok’, hypothesis (Cpres) allows
him to update (12) and (13) to
(20)
|Ψ〉W,t=2
RFSFW
= − |↑〉S |↑〉F
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
= −( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
) ∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
.
In the event W also measures ‘ok’, he updates his perspective to
(21) |Ψ〉W,t=3
RFSFW
= |ok〉L
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
and therefore W will be convinced that a measurement of S at t = 3 would result
in ‘up’ and ‘down’ with equal probability 1
2
.
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Similarly, upon hearing the announcement ‘ok’ from W , the external observer C
uses (Cpres) to update (16) to
(22)
|Ψ〉C,t=2
RFSFWW
= − |↑〉S |↑〉F
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
|0〉W
= −( 1√
2
|fail〉L −
1√
2
|ok〉L
) ∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
|0〉W ,
and, when W also announces ‘ok’, he uses hypothesis (Cpres) once more to arrive
at
(23) |Ψ〉C,t=3
RFSFWW
= |ok〉L
∣∣ok〉
L
∣∣ok〉
W
|ok〉W .
Accepting (Cpres) we reach the following conclusion:
If W announces ‘ok’, at t = 2 the agents W , W , and C expect that if
they were to measure S this would result in ‘up’. At t = 2 they also
expect that W will measure ‘ok’ with probability 1
2
. In that scenario, at
t = 3 they expect to find S in states ‘up’ and ‘down’ with probability 1
2
.
Inspecting various conclusions in this section and the previous one, no Frauchiger–
Renner paradox has arisen so far.
5. Discussion
Our analysis of the original Frauchiger–Renner Gedankenexperiment in Section
4, as well as that of the modified version studied in Section 3, reveals that in all
three scenarios the involved agents provide consistent records about the various
issues at stake. Thus the Gedankenexperiment reveals no inconsistency between
hypothesis (Q) on the validity of quantum mechanics and hypothesis (Cpres) on
sharing knowledge about the present.
Let us now revisit the steps (i), (ii), (iii) of Frauchiger and Renner’s analysis.
5.1. Discussion of steps (i) and (ii): Being measured. Frauchiger and Renner
claim (see statement F
n:02
in Box 3 in [9]) that by (Q),
“If F measures ‘tail’, at t = 0 F is certain that W will announce
‘fail’ at t = 3.”
This is step (i) in the sketch of their argument given in Subsection 2.1. From the
relational point of view this reasoning is problematic for reasons of self-reference:
F is part of the lab that is being measured by W at time t = 2 and consequently
she is not able to describe this measurement from her point of view. Because of
this, she is unable to make predictions about the joint state of R, S, F , W , and W
at times t > 2.
One could try to get around this by agreeing to consider W and W as external
agents and permit F to keep track of the joint state of R, S, and F only. Let us
analyse what happens from F ’s perspective in this “subplot” assuming her mea-
surement of R has given ‘tail’. Arguing as in (2), at time t = 1 (and then also at
time t = 2, since W is no longer in the plot) she describes the joint state of R, S,
and F as
(24) |Ψ〉F,t=1RSF = |Ψ〉F,t=2RSF = |t〉R
( 1√
2
|↑〉F |↑〉S +
1√
2
|↓〉F |↓〉S
)
= |t〉R |fail〉L .
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On the basis of this, F could argue at t = 1 that W will announce ‘fail’ at t = 3
(and thus obtain the Frauchiger–Renner paradox). It is not clear, however, how
F could arrive at this conclusion on the basis of (Q). Indeed, because she cannot
model W ’s actions, she cannot use (Q) to argue why they can be left out from the
plot.
Statement F
n:02
is used in [9] to deduce that if F finds ‘up’, then F is certain
at t = 1 that W will observe ‘fail’ at t = 3 (see statement Fn:14 on Box 3 in [9]).
This is step (ii) in the sketch of their argument given in Subsection 2.1. It suffers
from the same self-reference problem: the formalism does not permit F to describe
W ’s measurement on the lab of which F herself is part. Near the end of the next
subsection we will show that the conclusions drawn from Fn:14 are actually invalid.
5.2. Discussion of step (iii): Knowing the past. Steps (ii) and (iii) of the
Frauchiger–Renner argument employ assertions of the following format:
If at time t agent A knows p, then at time t agent A is certain that
agent B knew q at time t′ 6 t.
Are assertions of this type to be admitted in scientific reasoning? If taken literally
they belong to the domain of metaphysics, for one cannot check their truth (at least
not under (Q)) by time travelling back to t = k and askingB if he really knew. They
can only be made into meaningful and testable statements if there are surviving
records of B’s thoughts, for instance in the form of an entry in a notebook authored
by B at t = k. The notebook can be accepted by A at time t = l to be a reflection
of B’s thoughts at time t = k. In this process the metaphysical statement “A is
certain that B knew q at time t = k” is reinterpreted as the scientific statement “A
inspects B’s notebook at time t = l and finds the entry q”.
Frauchiger and Renner employ assertions of the above format in a non-trivial way
in at least two places, namely in their derivations of steps (ii) and (iii), through the
statements Fn:12 andW
n:22
(cited below) in Table 3 of [9] respectively. If one gives
these statements an operational meaning by equipping the agents with notebooks
and re-interpreting the statements accordingly, it turns out that that Fn:12 can
indeed be justified, in the sense that one arrives at the same statement on the basis
of the written records, but W
n:22
cannot: a different conclusion is reached on the
basis of these records.
Let us now turn to the mathematical details and begin with a look at the first
line of step (ii):
Statement Fn:12: If F measures ‘up’, then at t = 1 she is certain
that F must have measured ‘tail’ at t = 0.
This is statement Fn:12 in Table 3 of [9] and is of the format discussed above. We
have seen that, upon measuring S to be ‘up’, agent F updates her description of
the system to (4), i.e.,
(25) |Ψ〉F,t=1
RFSWW
= |t〉R |t〉F |↑〉S |0〉W |0〉W .
Hence she is certain that if she herself were to measure R at time t = 1 the outcome
would be ‘tail’. The statement that, on the basis of this, she is certain that F must
have measured ‘tail’ at t = 0 is only meaningful in the presence of a surviving record
of F ’s measurement. As an aside, notice that the particle S itself cannot play the
role of this record: for if it could, it would serve also as a record when F measures
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‘down’, but in that case F ’s description of the system is given by
(26)
|Ψ〉F,t=1
RFSWW
=
( 1√
2
|t〉R |t〉F +
1√
2
|h〉R |h〉F
)
|↓〉S |0〉W |0〉W
=
∣∣fail〉
L
|↓〉S |0〉W |0〉W ,
and nothing can be recovered from it about F ’s measurement of R at t = 0.
Thus we propose to extend the protocol by introducing a notebook N in which
F writes down the result of her measurement at t = 0. (Likewise, F needs a
notebook N in step (iii); see below). The assertion that F is certain that F must
have measured ‘tail’ at t = 0 can then be taken to mean that F is certain that an
inspection of the notebook N at time t = 1 will reveal that it contains the entry
‘tail’ (cf. the interpretation of the Gedankenexperiment from the point of view of
QBism in [9]).
Redoing the derivation of (4) with the notebook N added we arrive at
(27) |Ψ〉F,t=1
NRFSWW
= |t〉N |t〉R |t〉F |↑〉S |0〉W |0〉W .
This provides the justification of Fn:12.
Turning to the analysis of step (iii), consider the statement
Statement W
n:22
: If W measures ‘up’, then at t = 2 he is certain
that F must have measured ‘up’ at t = 1.
This is statement W
n:22
in Table 3 of [9] and again it is of the format discussed at
the beginning of this subsection. Providing F and F with notebooks N and N , the
description at time t = 1 given by W becomes
(28)
|Ψ〉W,t=1
NRFNSFW
=
( 1√
3
|t〉N |t〉R |t〉F
(|↑〉N |↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F )
+
1√
3
|h〉N |h〉R |h〉F |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
( 1√
3
|t〉N
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
− 1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
)(|↑〉N |↑〉S |↑〉F + |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F )
+
1√
3
|h〉N
( 1√
2
∣∣fail〉
L
+
1√
2
∣∣ok〉
L
) |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
|0〉W
=
(∣∣fail〉
L
( 1√
6
|t〉N |↑〉N |↑〉S |↑〉F +
1√
6
(|t〉N + |h〉N) |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F
)
+
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
6
(|h〉N − |t〉N) |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F − 1√6 |t〉N |↑〉N |↑〉S |↑〉F
))
|0〉W .
If the subsequent measurement of L gives ‘ok’, at t = 2 he updates this to
(29)
|Ψ〉W,t=2
NRFNSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
( 1√
3
(|h〉N − |t〉N) |↓〉N |↓〉S |↓〉F − 1√3 |t〉N |↑〉N |↑〉S |↑〉F
)
|0〉W .
Note the difference with (8), i.e.,
(30) |Ψ〉W,t=2
RFSFW
=
∣∣ok〉
L
|↑〉S |↑〉F |0〉W ,
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where the analogous term to the first term on the right-hand side of (29) disap-
peared by cancellation. Due to the presence of F ’s notebook N , this cancellation
doesn’t happen in (29) and W can no longer be sure that F ’s notebook N contains
the entry ‘up’. In this testable sense, he therefore he cannot claim to “be certain
at t = 2 that F must have measured ‘up’ at t = 1”.
This means that W
n:22
is false if it is interpreted as a testable statement about
the enlarged system that keeps records. We take the point of view that this is the
only meaningful interpretation of W
n:22
. One could try to maintain the validity of
W
n:22
as a true statement about the original system without notebooks while at
the same time accepting (29) as a true statement about the enlarged system with
notebooks. But in the absence of recordsW
n:22
becomes a metaphysical statement.
The labs L and L are entangled at the moment of W ’s measurement (from W ’s
perspective, by (7)), and therefore the measurement of L is in fact a measurement
of the joint system comprised of L and L which erases the memory that L and L
held about the state of S at time t = 1. At t = 2, W has no way of testing the
truth of W
n:22
by performing measurements on L and L. All that (8) and (30) tell
us is that W is certain that if he were to measure S at time t = 2 he would find
‘up’.
We conclude the analysis with a final remark about (29). It is of interest to
note that the non-cancellation disappears if only F is allowed to keep a notebook.
Apparently, the existence of recorded information about R makes all the difference,
even though statement W
n:22
contains no reference to R whatsoever. But if only
F gets a notebook we run into problems in the earlier analysis of step (ii) where
we needed F ’s notebook to interpret statement Fn:12. One and only one protocol
should describe the entire experiment, and therefore we are forced to equip both F
and F with notebooks.
5.3. Interaction-free detection of records. Comparison of (29) and (30) re-
veals a deeper issue. What does W expect to see if he were to enter lab L and
measure S at t = 2? In the original system without notebooks he is certain to find
‘up’, while in the enlarged system with notebooks the probability of finding ‘up’ is
down to 1
3
! Apparently the mere existence of the records influences the outcome.
Puzzling as this seems, one has to keep in mind that we are comparing statements
about different quantum mechanical systems.
This conundrum can be formulated as an interaction-free detection in the spirit
of [7]. Suppose that, after agreeing on the Frauchiger–Renner protocol (part of the
agreement being that no notebooks will be kept), F decides to cheat, takes a hidden
notebook from her pocket, and records the outcome secretly. When W measures S
at t = 2 he is convinced that (30) gives the correct description and therefore expects
to see ‘up’ with probability one. Much to his surprise, this happens only in one third
of the rounds; in two thirds of the rounds he measures ‘down’. Then he realises
that the secret use of a notebook by F would lead to (29) and, therefore, that
he was able to detect the existence of the secret record inside lab L by performing
measurements inside lab L.
5.4. Conclusion. From the point of view of RQM the Frauchiger–Renner paradox
disappears. All beliefs that various agents have at given moments time are consis-
tent with those of an external observer. The ‘paradox’ arises from a combination of
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implicit use of self-measurements and reasoning on the basis of inferences about the
past which do not stand up if records are kept. In the final subsection we showed
that the Frauchiger–Renner Gedankenexperiment provides an instance where the
mere existence of records influences the probabilities of measurement outcomes.
Acknowledgement – The authors thank Bas Janssens for enlightening discussions.
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